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Abstract 
Professor Kevin Flannery has helpfully drawn attention to some key sources for Magisterial teaching 
on “vital conflicts” where interventions to save a mother’s life would involve or lead to the death of 
her unborn child.  However, former responsa by the Holy Office on this topic from 1884 to 1902 
need to be interpreted carefully and understood in relation to the context of the time.  Recent 
teaching has indeed clarified that the condemnation of direct abortion is de fide.  Nevertheless, in 
the last forty years the Magisterium has, de facto, tolerated debate among faithful Catholic scholars 
over the ethics of craniotomy.  Appeal to former Magisterial teaching is not sufficient to settle this 
contemporary debate over what constitutes direct abortion.           
The case in question  
Recent cases in Brazil,1 the United States,2 and Ireland3 have caused concern among Catholics in 
relation to how to resolve vital conflicts between a mother and her unborn child.  These cases are 
very rare and typically are misreported by the media, misunderstood by the public, and exploited by 
lobby groups for the sake of a much wider pro-abortion agenda.  Nevertheless, the possibility cannot 
be discounted that, in a particular case, even today and even in a technologically highly-developed 
country, pregnancy or childbirth may threaten the life of an expectant mother and only the 
premature removal of her unborn child would alleviate this threat.   
The question then arises as to what authoritative Catholic teaching has to say about this kind of 
case.  For example, would any removal of the unborn child before viability necessarily constitute 
“direct abortion”?  If so, could such action nevertheless sometimes be justified?  If such a course of 
action were deemed to be justifiable, would this imply that, in the most extreme circumstances, it 
would also be permissible to dismember or decapitate the child, or to crush or empty the child’s 
head (a procedure known as “craniotomy”) in order to remove him or her from the womb?   
It is outside the scope of this paper to consider the handling by Church authorities of the particular 
cases that have generated public and ecclesial controversy in recent years.  Nor does the paper 
explore the issue of the putative medical necessity for extraction of the unborn child in these or 
similar cases.  The focus of this paper is purely on what the Church in her authoritative teaching has 
to say about interventions which aim to save the life of the mother, but which involve or lead to the 
death of her unborn child.  Professor Kevin Flannery in a lucid and well-referenced paper, argues 
that the teaching of Pope’s Pius XI and Pius XII, together with three important judgements of Holy 
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office (in 1884, 1895, and 1898) constitute a “strong and identifiable magisterial tradition”4 which 
rules out craniotomy and other such procedures as “incompatible with Church teaching”.5   
In a number of judgments, for example, the Holy Office stated that it was not safe to teach that 
craniotomy is permissible, not even in circumstances where, “if it is omitted, mother and infant will 
die, but, if performed, the mother will be saved but the infant will die”.6  In a similar fashion the Holy 
Office condemned premature delivery before viability as well as the premature removal of an 
unborn child before viability, whether by caesarean section or by laparotomy (in the case of ectopic 
pregnancy).  The Holy Office also enunciated a more general ethical principle, subsequently 
reiterated by Pope XI and Pope XII, that “saving the mother is a noble end, but the direct killing of 
the child as a means to such an end is not licit”.7  This paper aims to examine the authority of such 
pronouncements, their interpretation in their historical context, and their application to the current 
moral theological debate over vital conflicts.  
Levels and sources of Church teaching 
God gave to the Church the gift of the Holy Spirit so that she could proclaim to all the nations the 
truth of the gospel.  It is therefore an essential mark of the Church that she teaches with authority.  
In a Catholic understanding, this authority was given by Christ to the apostles and then to the 
bishops as successors to the apostles, and especially to the bishop of Rome who maintains the unity 
of the college of bishops.  The decree of the Second Vatican Council on the Church, Lumen Gentium, 
sets out three levels of authoritative Church teaching:  
In the first place there are statements, such as the articles of the Nicene Creed, which have been 
solemnly declared by a pope or ecumenical council of the Church to be binding on all the faithful.  
In the second place there are truths of the faith, which have not been the subject of a specific act of 
declaration, but are essential to the faith and are proclaimed in the ordinary teaching of the bishops 
of the Church throughout the world.  These truths of the “ordinary and universal Magisterium” are 
also binding on the faithful.  The pope may sometimes declare something to be a truth of faith 
where this declaration is not an act of defining dogma, but is rather an explicit recognition of what 
was already binding as ordinary teaching. 
In the third place there are teachings of the bishops, and in particular of the pope, which are not 
infallible or unchangeable, but which express the faith in a particular time and place and, as such, 
demand of the faithful “the religious submission of mind and will” [religiosum voluntatis et 
intellectus obsequium].8  This phrase reflects the fact that such teaching is not only an exercise of 
external discipline or juridical authority but is an expression of teaching authority and to be received 
as such.  Such teaching gives the faithful not only a reason to act (as the exercise of legitimate 
political authority gives citizens a valid reason to act) but also provides authoritative guidance about 
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what to believe.  The content of this teaching is evident from “the character of the documents, from 
[the pope’s] frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner of speaking”.9 
The understanding provided of the Second Vatican Council has been further expounded by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) in a document on the role of a theologian within the 
Church, Donum Veritatis.  This makes explicit, for example, that the Church’s teaching authority 
extends to moral truth as well as truths of faith.10  The document also points out that the pope is 
assisted in his work by the Roman curia and in particular by the CDF.11  In relation to teaching that is 
“per se not irreformable”,12 the document clarifies that while such teaching demands religious 
submission of mind and will, this submission is nevertheless qualified such that a theologian may 
raise questions about the timeliness, the form, or even the contents of the teaching.  “Here the 
theologian will need, first of all, to assess accurately the authoritativeness of the interventions which 
becomes clear from the nature of the documents, the insistence with which a teaching is repeated, 
and the very way in which it is expressed.”13  
The account of three levels of authoritative Church teaching also shapes the new Profession of Faith 
provided in 1998 for those who teach in Catholic theological faculties.14  The essential structural 
features of that profession were already explicit in Lumen Gentium.  For the purposes of this paper, 
authoritative Catholic teaching is understood in the sense expounded in these documents, and in 
particular in Lumen Gentium 25.  
De fide Catholic teaching on abortion 
In relation to the first level of Church teaching authority, as set out above, there has been no de fide 
definition on abortion.  There have been statements and actions by popes and ecumenical councils 
in relation to abortion, but there have been no declarations which were intended, by that very act, 
to define the limits of Catholic doctrine.15 
In relation to the second level of authority, however, it seems that there is de fide teaching, not 
based on a particular act of teaching but based on the ordinary and universal teaching of the Church.  
In particular, Church teaching has constantly characterised the deliberate killing of the unborn child 
by abortion as a grave sin. 
The Church’s teaching in this area has been formed in relation to what may be called the “central 
case” of procured abortion, where people have recourse to procured abortion in order to dispose of 
an unwanted child.  An unborn child may be unwanted by his or her parents for many different 
reasons, sometimes because of some characteristics of the child, his disability or her gender, but 
most frequently because of the circumstances or life-concerns of the parents.  They do not wish to 
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have a child at this time or in this situation.  In the central case, it is precisely the continued 
existence of the child that is perceived to be the problem, and therefore the extinguishing of that life 
is no side-effect of the action but is the direct and deliberate intention of the abortion.  It is the 
constant teaching of the Church that deliberate killing of the unborn child by abortion in this way is a 
grave moral disorder, an injustice to the child, and an act utterly incompatible with Christian charity. 
There has been development in the history of the Church in relation to her structures of discipline, 
penance, and canon law, and these changes have affected the Church’s pastoral response to 
abortion.  The Church has not always imposed the same canonical penalty for the offence of 
procuring abortion.16  Similarly, the question as to the origin of the human soul and the timing of 
“animation” or “ensoulment” is a one that has been answered differently by theologians in different 
times and places.  In the Middle Ages, as is well known, the common opinion among theologians was 
that the spiritual soul was given only after the body of the fetus was formed. 17  Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding such variations in discipline and in theological opinion about ensoulment, the 
Church’s teaching on the morality of abortion in the central case has been constant.18  
This constant teaching is recalled in a document of the CDF in 1974 which states that “the tradition 
of the Church has always held that human life must be protected and favoured from the 
beginning”.19  One of the earliest witnesses to this tradition is the Didache, a Christian work from the 
early second century, where it is stated that “You shall not kill by abortion the fruit of the womb and 
you shall not murder the infant already born”.20  The CDF document produces a long succession of 
witnesses to the same teaching, ending with a quotation from Pope Paul VI, who declared that the 
teaching of the Church on this matter “has not changed and is unchangeable”.21  
The authority of the Church’s teaching on abortion was reiterated and clarified by Pope John Paul II 
in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae.  The language of this statement makes it clear that the pope 
regards this teaching as de fide, not on the basis of a particular declaration, but on the basis of the 
ordinary Magisterium (Pope John Paul II cites Lumen Gentium 25 precisely on this point).  
Therefore, by the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, in 
communion with the Bishops - who on various occasions have condemned abortion and who 
in the aforementioned consultation, albeit dispersed throughout the world, have shown 
unanimous agreement concerning this doctrine - I declare that direct abortion, that is, 
abortion willed as an end or as a means, [sive uti finem intentum seu ut instrumentum] 
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always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent 
human being [deliberata exsistat innocentis hominis occisio]. This doctrine is based upon the 
natural law and upon the written Word of God, is transmitted by the Church's Tradition and 
taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.22 
The definition of abortion in this key paragraph closely reflects that given earlier in the encyclical: 
“procured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing [deliberata est ac directa hominis occisio], by 
whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the initial phase of his or her existence, 
extending from conception to birth”.23 This definition reflects that given by the Pontifical 
Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the Code of Canon Law in 1988.  Abortion is not only 
the expulsion of the immature fetus but is also “the killing of the fetus in any way and at any time 
from the moment of conception” [de eiusdem fetus occisione quocumque modo et quocumque 
tempore a momento conceptionis procuretur].24  It is important to note that the de fide teaching of 
the ordinary magisterium is framed, at least in the first instance, in relation to abortion in the central 
case, that is, abortion which involves the deliberate and direct killing of an unborn child.  This is how 
the term “direct abortion” is defined and understood in Evangelium Vitae.25     
When we move from the central case to the morality of interventions which aim to save a mother’s 
life, but which involve or lead to the death of her unborn child, the issues are more complex.  To 
understand the teaching of the Church in this area it is necessary first to set out elements of the 
history of the tradition and then to consider specific Magisterial statements within the context of 
that history. 
Vital conflicts between mother and child in Catholic thought  
Whereas the Church’s teaching about abortion in the central case has been constant throughout 
Christian history, the same cannot be said in relation to interventions where the aim is to resolve a 
vital conflict between mother and child.  In relation to such cases, there has been and continues to 
be a complex and developing discussion among faithful Catholic theologians.  Furthermore, in 
contrast to the Jewish rabbinic tradition, interventions which aim to save a mother’s life, but which 
involve or lead to the death of her unborn child, were not discussed during the most important 
formative period of the Catholic tradition.  Such cases are not mentioned by any of the Church 
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fathers (with the exception of an obscure passage in Tertullian26) nor is there discussion of such 
cases in any of the works of theologians of the high Middle Ages.   
A detailed account of the Catholic tradition on these vital conflicts, from the time it eventually 
emerged until the mid-twentieth century, has been provided by John Connery in his study of the 
history of Catholic thought on abortion.27  The outlines of his account are summarised here only to 
set out the historical context for understanding the various interventions of the Church’s Magisterial 
on the issue.  According to Connery, there was no discussion of abortion to save a mother’s life 
published by any Catholic scholar until the middle of the fifteenth century.  The first example 
Connery gives is Saint Antoninus of Florence, though Antoninus was drawing on an unpublished 
work by fellow Dominican, John of Naples composed a century before.28  
Antoninus and John of Naples defended the view that it is morally acceptable for a physician 
deliberately to procure an abortion to save the mother’s life, if the fetus has not yet received a 
rational soul (which was thought to occur when the body was “formed” which was placed at around 
forty days for males and later for females).  However, if the soul had been received or if it was 
uncertain whether the soul been received, then deliberate abortion would not be morally 
acceptable.  The position that abortion to save a mother’s life may be permissible, if done prior to 
ensoulment, was the dominant opinion in the fifteenth and early sixteenth century and was 
prominently defended in the seventeenth century by Thomas Sanchez.29  Furthermore, this position 
was not condemned by the Church before the nineteenth century by which time it had become 
redundant as by then most theologians had come to think that ensoulment occurred at conception, 
in which case there simply was no possibility of abortion prior to this point.30 
It was the Franciscan Antoninus of Corduba in the mid-sixteenth century who introduced a 
distinction that was to have an enduring impact within the Catholic tradition on vital conflicts 
between mother and unborn child.  Corduba argued that if an intervention was in itself health-giving 
[salutifera], having the immediate effect improving the health of the woman, and if it were needed 
to save the woman’s life, then it could be used even if it had the side-effect of causing a miscarriage.  
In contrast, if the means used were in themselves deadly [mortifera], directly causing the death of 
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the child, then they were not permissible.31  John de Lugo later developed Corduba’s distinction to 
emphasise not the immediacy of the causality but rather the intention.32  According to this view, 
abortion was “direct” and always impermissible when it was directly intended but indirectly causing 
a miscarriage might sometimes be justified where this was an unintended or accidental side-effect of 
a good action.  
In the seventeenth century most Catholic theologians agreed that, in extreme circumstances, it 
could be morally acceptable to cause a miscarriage if this were an indirect and unintended effect of 
a life-saving action.  Direct abortion was allowed, if at all, only before animation.  Connery is only 
able to find one seventeenth century example, a French Jesuit called Theophile Raynaud, who 
explicitly argued in favour of direct abortion of an ensouled fetus to save the life of the mother.33  
His argument was on the basis that the child could be classified as an unjust aggressor so that 
abortion would be analogous to killing in self-defence.   
In the nineteenth century most theologians held that “direct abortion” was never permissible, 
though a minority held that direct abortion to save a mother’s life could be justified on the grounds 
of self-defence.  The latter part of the century was dominated by controversy concerning what 
counted as “direct abortion”.  Antonio Ballerini defended the position that inducing early delivery 
(acceleratio partus) before viability need not involve the intention to kill.  Connery summarises this 
position by saying that Ballerini distinguished between “direct abortion and direct killing”.34  
However, it seems doubtful that Ballerini would have been happy to call acceleratio partus 
“abortion” (or “direct abortion” or “therapeutic abortion”).  His view, if I understand it correctly, was 
that it did not fall under the definition of abortion if it was not directed to bringing about the death 
of the child.  The removal of the child from the womb may be deliberate, but where there is no 
intention to kill, Ballerini seems to have held that it would be misleading to call the procedure an 
“abortion”.  
Around the same time Daniel Viscosi argued that even craniotomy need not involve the intention to 
kill.  The doctor’s intention in crushing the head was simply to remove the child from the womb.  
Viscosi argued that this position followed logically from the acceptance of acceleratio partus.  
However, Ballerini denied that acceptance of acceleratio partus implied acceptance of craniotomy 
and other immediate physical assaults on the child.  
As a result of a number of interventions by the Holy Office (discussed below), Catholic moral 
theologians of the early twentieth century no longer defended acceleratio partus or craniotomy.  In 
this period the debate shifted to the question of how to treat ectopic pregnancy.  In 1933 an 
American Jesuit called T. Lincoln Bouscaren argued that removing the fallopian tube which included 
the ectopic embryo was not a “direct” attack on the child and could therefore be morally acceptable 
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if it were necessary in order to save the life of the mother.35  This position was defended on the 
analogy with removing a cancerous womb when the woman happened to be pregnant.   
Connery ends his history in 1950, however debate over vital conflicts continued in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  The Second Vatican Council (1963-1965) encouraged theologians to move 
beyond the forms and methods of theology dominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century and to renew theology by a return to the sources, by attentiveness to experience, and by 
dialogue with other traditions.  At the same time a culture shift was occurring within Western 
society away from the perceived restrictions of traditional mores, especially in relation to sexual 
morality.  This context encouraged theologians to question the Church’s traditional teaching on a 
range of moral issues such that, when Paul VI reaffirmed Church condemnation of contraception in 
Humanae Vitae in 1968, a number of theologians explicitly dissented from his teaching. 
What united many dissenters and faithful theologians and philosophers in the period that followed 
Humanae Vitae was a common belief that the dominant forms of moral theology and philosophy 
practiced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had been in need of renewal.36  This 
critical evaluation of Catholic moral thought in the period immediately prior to the Second Vatican 
Council was expressed not only by theologians and philosophers but also by dicasteries of the Holy 
See.  A good example would be the comment of the Congregation for Education in 1976, “In the 
past, moral theology exhibited at times a certain narrowness of vision and some lacunas.  This was 
due in large part to a kind of legalism, to an individualistic orientation, and to a separation from the 
sources of Revelation.”37  Indeed, a dissatisfaction with the state of moral theology seems to be 
implied by the call from the Second Vatican Council for moral theology to be “renewed through a 
more living contact with the mystery of Christ” and for its scientific exposition to be “nourished 
more on the teaching of the Bible”.38 
Among those who dissented from Humanae Vitae, many followed a new method in moral theology 
termed proportionalism.39  This method was revisionist in that it allowed consequences sometimes 
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The Thomist 59 (1995): 1-19. 
38 Vatican Council II, Optatam Totius (October 28, 1965) n. 16 
39 Proportionalism was the self-designation of a school that flourished in 1970s and 1980s but was condemned 
under that name in John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (August 6, 1993) nn. 71-81.  For two different views on 
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to “outweigh” traditional moral prohibitions.  It had great relevance for the question of vital conflicts 
because it effectively dissolved the distinction of directly intended effects and foreknown but 
unintended effects.  Within a proportionalist methodology vital conflicts should be resolved by 
securing the best consequences, by whatever means.  Indeed, not only did proportionalism justify 
abortion to save a mother’s life, but where the child was unlikely to survive, abortion would seem to 
be justifiable for a broad range of reasons, including social and personal reasons.  
Within the Anglophone world, perhaps the most prominent critics of proportionalism have been 
Germain Grisez and John Finnis and the new school of moral analysis sometimes termed the New 
Natural Law Theory.40  Whereas proportionalists dissented from the current teaching of the 
Magisterium, Grisez, Finnis, and others who followed them have been faithful to the Magisterium, 
not only in relation to Humanae Vitae but in their attitude to the Magisterium more generally.  
Furthermore, in contrast to proportionalism, Grisez is able to provide a defence of the binding 
character of absolute moral prohibitions, including the prohibition on “direct killing” of the 
innocent.41   
In relation to vital conflicts, Grsiez and Finnis absolutely reject the directly intended killing of the 
unborn child even for the sake of saving the life of the mother.  Nevertheless, in 1970 Germain 
Grisez defended the view that craniotomy in the context of a vital conflict could be characterised as 
unintended killing42 and hence, in the language of the tradition, may not be “direct abortion”.  
Grisez’s account of craniotomy is similar to that given by Viscosi in the late nineteenth century, 
except that Grisez places craniotomy in the context of a generalised and detailed account of 
intention and action.  Grisez clarified his arguments in 199343 and also in an important joint article 
with John Finnis and Joseph Boyle in 2001.44  The Finnis-Grsiez-Boyle defence of craniotomy has 
been much disputed by other Catholic moral philosophers and theologians, but craniotomy has 
recently been defended, on different grounds (on the basis of a form of virtue theory), by another 
non-dissenting, non-censured Catholic scholar Martin Rhonheimer.45   
As the period since the Second Vatican Council has seen a revival in discussion of the ethics of 
craniotomy so it has also seen further debate on methods of treating ectopic pregnancy.  The 
predominant opinion of Catholic moral theologians from the 1930s to the Second Vatican Council 
was that removing the tube together with the embryo was licit, but theologians typically held that 
removing the embryo alone was “direct killing” and was not licit.  This opinion is now increasingly 
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questioned.  In particular it is argued by some that surgery to “scoop out” the embryo but leave the 
tube intact (salpingostomy) is not morally different to removing the tube (salpingectomy).  It is also 
argued, by some, that the drug methotrexate causes the ectopic embryo to be expelled and on this 
basis should be regarded as morally equivalent to salpingostomy.46  It should however be noted that 
some of the theologians or philosophers who would permit use of methotrexate are critical of 
Grisez’s moral theory and would not follow him in regarding craniotomy as morally permissible in 
certain cases.   
The period since the Second Vatican Council has thus seen a divergence between dissenting schools 
of moral theology or philosophy (some subsequently censured) and non-dissenting, non-censured 
schools, and also a divergence between different non-dissenting schools.  Among the most 
prominent non-dissenting schools, those who follow the approach developed by German Grisez and 
John Finnis have explicitly defended the permissibility of craniotomy while others have defended the 
use of methotrexate for ectopic pregnancy.  It should nevertheless be noted that there is no 
consensus in favour of these conclusions.  They are matters of dispute among faithful Catholic 
philosophers and theologians.  
Magisterial interventions on abortion and vital conflicts 
Magisterial interventions on the issue of abortion in vital conflict situations cover four periods: 1679, 
1884-1902, 1930-1952, and 1968-2009. Flannery primarily discusses the middle two periods, but it is 
helpful to put these in a wider context including teaching prior to the nineteenth century and 
subsequent to the Second Vatican Council.   
It is noteworthy that in the seventeenth century, in the context of a vigorous debate about whether 
“direct abortion” is ever permissible, the Holy Office did not condemn all direct abortion per se nor 
even did it condemn all direct abortion after ensoulment.  Rather, within a list of sixty-five “laxist” 
propositions, it condemned only two concerning abortion: 
[34] It is permissible to procure abortion before the ensoulment of the foetus lest the girl known to 
be pregnant be killed or disgraced. 
[35] It seems probable that all foetuses in the womb lack a rational soul and that they first begin to 
have one when then are born.  Consequently it must be said that abortion never involves 
homicide.47 
The first proposition was apparently defended by Torreblanca, but it was associated with Thomas 
Sanchez in as much as several theologians argued that it followed from his position.48  The second 
                                                          
46 For example Benedict M. Ashley, Jean deBlois, Kevin D. O'Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological 
Analysis Fifth edition (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 82; William E. May Catholic Bioethics 
and the Gift of Life second edition (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor, 2008), 199–202; Kaczor, “The Ethics of 
Ectopic Pregnancy: A Critical Reconsideration of Salpingostomy and Methotrexate,” Linacre Quarterly 76.3 
(August 2009): 265–282. 
47 Holy Office Errores varii de rebus moralibus (March 4, 1679); Connery Abortion, 189; Jones Soul of the 
Embryo, 183. 
48 Connery “Grisez on Abortion”, 173, takes issue with Grisez and Noonan for ascribing this view to Sanchez 
and this is one of the misapprehensions he seeks to correct this in his book Abortion (135-137).  Curran 
“Abortion” is clear that this view of Torreblanca should not be attributed to Sanchez (176). 
proposition, that the rational soul is given at birth, was defended by John Marcus, physician general 
of the Kingdom of Bohemia.   
Both propositions have relevance for the issue of vital conflicts.  The first concerns abortion where 
the threat to life is indirect and external and is not immediately a matter of health or disease.  The 
abortion conforms to what this paper has termed the “central case” of procured abortion: abortion 
in order to dispose of a child (the child’s death willed as a means in order to prevent scandal and 
avoid danger of being killed).  The second proposition is relevant to vital conflicts if one accepts the 
position of Antoninus of Florence (as many seventeenth century theologians did) that direct 
abortion may be permissible if it is done before ensoulment but not after this point.  Though neither 
condemnation rules out direct abortion prior to ensoulment to overcome an immediate and internal 
health-threat to the mother, the effect of the condemnations was to encourage the view that direct 
abortion is never morally acceptable.  By the nineteenth century this had become the dominant view 
among Catholic philosophers and theologians. 
The second set of Magisterial interventions, three of which Flannery describes in detail, concerned 
whether craniotomy, acceleratio partus and surgery for ectopic pregnancy necessarily involve “direct 
abortion”.  In 1869 the Sacred Penitentiary had responded to a query about craniotomy with the 
advice to consult the guidance of well-tested and reliable theologians (auctores probati).49 
Subsequent to this ambiguous response there followed fifteen years of heated debate among 
Catholic moral theologians as to whether craniotomy and/or acceleratio partus were morally 
acceptable.  This debate was brought to the attention of the Holy Office and resulted in a series of 
five responses (in 1884, 1889, 1895, 1898, and 1902).  It is useful to take them in order.   
The first, and in many ways the most significant, 50 was on 31 May 1884 in response to a question 
from the Cardinal Archbishop of Lyons, “May it safely be taught in Catholic schools that craniotomy 
is permissible when otherwise both mother and fetus will perish, but with the operation, although 
the child will perish, the mother’s life will be saved?”51  
The response of the Holy Office was clear: “It cannot safely be taught”. Tuto doceri non posse.  
Following this a series of six cases were presented by the Archbishop of Cambrai to which a response 
was given on 19 August 1889.52  Rather than treat each of the cases individually the Holy Office 
reiterated the teaching on craniotomy (referring back to the 1884 decision) and articulated the 
principle that this prohibition applies to any surgical operation that directly kills the fetus or the 
mother, quamcumque chirurgicam operationem directe occisivam foetus vel matris gestantis. 
This decision raised the question as to whether inducing delivery before viability “directly kills”.  The 
Archbishop of Cambrai presented to the Holy Office the case of a physician who induced delivery of 
a fetus before viability in order to save a mother’s life, but who took care not to use means that 
would themselves be lethal (for example craniotomy or dismemberment).  Could a physician 
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perform such an operation in such circumstances?  On 24 July 1895, the Holy Office responded: 
“Negatively, in accord with the other decrees of 28 May 1884 and 19 August 1888.”53 
This 1895 decision was further clarified in a response of 4 May 1898, to which Pope Leo XIII gave his 
assent.  On this occasion the question had three parts: concerning premature deliver; concerning 
abortion and caesarean section; and concerning surgery in the case of ectopic pregnancy.  The Holy 
Office responded that acceleratio partus is licit if done for sufficient reason, but only if it is done in 
such a way as to consider the life of the mother and the fetus matris et foetus vitae consulatur. 
Procuring abortion is excluded, according to the decree of 1895, and caesarean section is acceptable 
only if done when the child is viable.  Similarly surgery to remove an ectopic fetus from the mother 
(laparotomia) may be licit, but only if, as far as possible, the lives of both mother and fetus are 
carefully and opportunely preserved et foetus et matris vitae serio et opportune provideatur.54 
The qualification “as far as possible” (quantum fieri potest) led to the 1898 decision being read in 
opposite ways.  If it was not in fact possible to preserve both the lives of mother and unborn child, 
was it allowed to tolerate the death of the child in order better to preserve the life of the mother?  
To resolve this ambiguity the Holy Office revisited the issue of ectopic pregnancy.  On 20 March 1902 
the Holy Office responded to the question whether it was licit to remove an ectopic fetus from the 
mother while the fetus was immature, which the question defined as being under six months of 
gestational age.  The answer was, “Negatively, in accord with the decree of 4 May 1898, by which 
the lives of the fetus and mother, as far as possible, are carefully and opportunely preserved.”55  
During the third period of Magisterial interventions, from 1930 to 1951, Pope Pius XI and Pope Pius 
XII reiterated the principle that direct killing of the unborn child is not permissible even for the sake 
of saving the mother’s life.  In 1930 in the encyclical Casti connubii, Pius XI specifically rejected 
accounts of the “therapeutic indication” for abortion which appeal to the idea of defending oneself 
against an unjust aggressor, (an argument, it may be noted, that had previously had some currency 
within the Catholic tradition).  The unborn child is not an unjust aggressor and direct killing of the 
innocent (directam innocentis necem) is contrary to the commandment of God.  At this point Pius XI 
cited three of the decisions of the Holy Office (1898, 1895 and 1884).56  Similarly, in 1951 Puis XII 
repeated the principle that “the direct deliberate disposition of an innocent human life, that is to 
say, a disposition that aims at its destruction either as an end or as a means to another end” is never 
permissible.57  Pius XII explicitly distinguishes such “direct killing” from those cases where “saving 
the life of the future mother, independently of her condition of pregnancy, urgently required a 
surgical procedure or another therapeutic application, which would have as an accessory 
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consequence, in no way desired or intended, but inevitable, the death of the fetus, such an action 
could not be called a direct attack on the innocent life”.58 
The decisions of the Holy Office and the declarations of Pius XI and Pius XII constitute strong 
Magisterial support for the principle that direct and intentional killing of the unborn child is never 
morally acceptable, even when this would be the only available means to save the life of the mother.  
This constitutes an important clarification of doctrine as this principle had not always been 
universally agreed or clearly articulated in the Catholic tradition in previous centuries.  It may be 
noted that John Paul II in declaring Catholic teaching on abortion to be de fide, uses the same 
language of “direct abortion” and “direct killing”.  
What is much less clear, however, is the proper application of these Magisterial statements to the 
question of what constitutes direct killing of the unborn child.  The summary of Connery seems fair: 
the Catholic scholars defending craniotomy, or defending acceleratio partus, caesarean section or 
laparotomy prior to viability, sought to persuade Church authorities that such actions were only 
indirectly lethal.  It was “their failure to do this convincingly that led to the condemnations of their 
opinions”.59  Nevertheless, this succinct summary of events immediately raises an obvious question: 
might other theologians arguing differently and working in a different context, be more convincing in 
making such a case? 
In this regard it should be noticed that already in the 1930s there was a significant development in 
Catholic understanding of vital conflicts in this area.  The Holy Office decision of 1902 had prohibited 
the surgical removal of the embryo before viability in the case of ectopic pregnancy.  Later 
theologians defended the practice of removing the tube and embryo together (salpingectomy), on 
the basis that this was not direct killing but analogous to removing a cancerous womb.  However, 
while the permissibility of salpingectomy has become received opinion among Catholic moral 
theologians60 it nevertheless stands in explicit contradiction to the wording of the 1902 judgement.  
Salpingectomy is a deliberate surgical intervention which knowingly involves removing the ectopic 
child from the body of the mother while he or she is too immature to be viable [e sinu matris 
extrahere fetus ectopicos adhuc immaturos].  Furthermore this operation contradicts the broader 
principle, enunciated by the Holy Office, that surgery is acceptable for ectopic pregnancy only if “the 
lives of both mother and fetus are preserved” fetus et matris vitae… serio et opportune providendum 
est.61 
It may be argued that salpingectomy, while contravening the Holy Office judgements of 1898 and 
1902, is permissible on the basis of Pius XII’s defence of interventions that cause the death of the 
unborn child indirectly.  However, Pius XII did not address the question of ectopic pregnancy.  He 
wisely took as the prime instance of “indirect” killing the clearer example of the harm that comes 
from interventions given for reasons “independently of her condition of pregnancy”.62  This 
                                                          
58 Pius XII, Speech to the Association of large families (November 27, 1951) quoted by the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, “Clarification on procured abortion” (July 11, 2009) and by Benedict Guevin, “Vital 
Conflicts and Virtue Ethics” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 679-688 but not by 
Flannery, “Vital Conflicts”. 
59 Connery Abortion, 312.   
60 As noted by Flannery “Vital Conflicts” 703. 
61 Holy Office 1902 quoting 1898 emphasis added.   
62 Pius XII, Speech to the Association of large families. 
description is helpful for enunciating the principle and would cover, for example, the removal of the 
cancerous womb of a pregnant woman, but it can hardly be argued that treatment of ectopic 
pregnancy is for reasons altogether “independent of her condition of pregnancy”.  It is the precisely 
the ectopic pregnancy that causes the pathology.   
The apparent contradiction between emergent theological acceptance of salpingectomy and a prima 
facie reading of the responses of 1898 and 1902 does not show that the former is impermissible or 
that the latter have no authority.  Rather it seems to show that, even in the 1930s, Catholic scholarly 
opinion on vital conflict had developed and that philosophers and theologians had succeeded, in at 
least one case, in giving convincing reasons to think such an intervention was not direct killing.  If the 
licitness of salpingectomy is regarded as probable, or even as tolerable, then it follows that the 
decisions of the Holy Office of 1884, 1889, 1895, 1898 and 1902 in relation to vital conflicts require 
very careful interpretations before they are applied to the current debate.  
As there was a development in moral reflection on ectopic pregnancy even in the 1930s, brought 
about by subsequent scholarly debate, much more was there a transformation in the context of 
moral theology in the latter part of the twentieth century in the wake of the Second Vatican Council.   
Recent Magisterial interventions on abortion and vital conflicts 
Reference has already been made to a number of Magisterial statements on abortion in the period 
1968 to 2009. The first of these is Humanae Vitae which condemns direct abortion not as direct 
killing but as an instance of the “direct interruption of the generative process already begun”.63  This 
teaching would clearly be relevant to abortion in the central case if abortion were being viewed as a 
means of birth control, as sometimes seems to be the case.  The applicability of this teaching to vital 
conflicts is in circumstances where it is precisely generation that is the cause of the problem, for 
example, where the danger is a result of suicidal ideation putatively linked to being pregnant or to 
the prospect of giving birth to this child in these circumstances.64   On the other hand, in emergency 
interventions where the act does not have as its aim or intention destroying the nascent life within 
the womb or preventing the child from being born, then neither would it constitute the direct or 
deliberate “interruption of the generative process”.  This condemnation thus also turns on whether 
the act involves direct killing of what is being generated.   
In 1974, in the face of widespread moves within Western nations to withdraw legal protection from 
the unborn child, the CDF issued a document on procured abortion. This had as its aim “to recall [the 
Church’s] teaching in its essential aspects”.65   The basis of this teaching is the recognition that 
human life is a precious gift of God and under God’s protection.  This is expressed in the Divine 
commandment, “You shall not kill”. 66  The document reiterates the condemnation of all direct 
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abortion, “that is abortion willed either as an end or a means”.67  The rationale for this prohibition is 
that “Divine law and human reason exclude all direct killing of an innocent human man”.68  This 
prohibition has force even in the face of great difficulties which a woman might face even if it is a 
matter of “a serious question of health, sometimes of life or death, for the mother”.69  According to 
the CDF even the most serious reasons cannot “objectively confer the right to dispose of another’s 
life”.70  The use of the word “dispose” here closely echoes the earlier use of this term by Puis XII in 
the same context and should be taken to refer to “the direct deliberate disposition of an innocent 
human life, that is to say, a disposition that aims at its destruction either as an end or as a means to 
another end”.71   
The most important Magisterial statement on abortion in recent years is Evangelium Vitae, in which 
Pope John Paul II declares that Catholic teaching on direct abortion is de fide.  This paper has already 
described how, in this encyclical, Pope John Paul II defines abortion not by reference to expulsion of 
the child from the womb but as the direct and deliberate killing of a human being by whatever 
means.72  It is then a moot question whether or not the deliberate removal of an unborn child prior 
to viability necessarily constitutes “direct and deliberate killing”.  If acceleratio partus is sometimes 
permissible, for example in cases where the child is viable, then it would seem that the intention to 
remove the child from the womb prematurely is not wrong per se.  It is causing the death of the child 
that makes the act wrong.  However, where the inability of the child to survive outside the womb is 
not part of the intention in removing it, then it would seem, prima facie, that the action is not 
intentional killing (though of course as an act that leads to the death of a child, even if unintended, it 
would require special justification without which it would be gravely wrong).  If it could be 
demonstrated that the direct and deliberate removal of an immature child from the womb need not 
conform to the definition “direct and deliberate killing” then in such as case it would seem not to be 
included in the definition of “procured abortion” given by Pope John Paul II.  
In relation to what Ballerini and others regarded as lethal attacks on the child, such as decapitation 
or craniotomy, it is more difficult to argue that the death is unintended.  Clearly death in this case is 
unwanted, but where death always follows from certain kinds of acts (such as decapitation or the 
crushing of the skull into small pieces) then it is arguable that such actions simply constitute killing.  
In response to this move, Finnis, Grisez and Boyle argue that effects which always occur may still be 
unintended, and quote in their defence the teaching of John Paul II that, “by the object of a given 
moral act, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on 
the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world”.73   
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It is curious that Flannery does not cite the Magisterial teaching of Evangelium Vitae and the 
definition of abortion given by Pope John Paul II.  Nevertheless, he makes some reference to 
Magisterial teaching subsequent to the Second Vatican Council, for he alleges that the account of 
action given by Grisez, and hence Grisez’s account of craniotomy, is contrary to the teaching of 
Thomas Aquinas that underpins John Paul II’s encyclical on fundamental moral principles, Veritatis 
Splendor.74  This is an important and highly relevant teaching document and it is indeed certain that 
when John Paul II wrote this encyclical he was aware of writing of Grisez, Finnis and others of that 
school.  However, it highly implausible to construe Veritatis Splendor as an attack on that account of 
human action.  Where the encyclical condemns various concepts and schools of thought in moral 
philosophy or theology it does so overtly using the preferred terms of the school in question.  There 
is nothing in the encyclical in relation to the account developed by Grisez and Finnis that is remotely 
analogous to the pope’s overt condemnation of “proportionalism”.   
Indeed, together with William E. May, John Finnis had been central to a paper written in 1990 for 
the International Theological Commission on the subject of moral absolutes which was preparatory 
to the encyclical.  Furthermore, Grisez was involved directly in more than one stage of the drafting of 
Veritatis Splendor,75 and, at the invitation of the CDF, Finnis and Grisez contributed an article on its 
main theses in Osservatore Romano as part of a series of articles on the encyclical.   
The argument of Flannery is not that Veritatis Splendor was directed against the action theory 
developed by Grisez and Finnis.  He makes the more indirect claim that the encyclical treats Thomas 
Aquinas as authoritative and that St Thomas’s understanding of the “object” of the human act is 
incompatible with that of Grisez and Finnis.  It is not within the scope of this paper to assess whether 
Flannery is correct in his claim that Grisez departs from Thomas Aquinas on this key point.  What is 
pertinent to the argument of this paper is simply to note that, in his exposition of Thomas, Flannery 
goes far beyond the account given by John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor.  Flannery’s invocation of that 
encyclical thus functions as the introduction to a substantive discussion of the moral thought of 
Thomas Aquinas rather than as a direct exposition of Magisterial teaching.  This shift is somewhat 
obscured by Flannery’s assertion that the Church “would be contracting herself” were she to “put 
forward ideas incompatible with Aquinas’s core insights”.76  Even to the degree that Flannery’s claim 
is uncontentious, there is surely a wide spectrum of opinion, not least among Thomists, as to how to 
characterise “Aquinas’s core insights”.  Furthermore, in relation to such opinions, there is good 
reason to think that Pope John Paul II did not wish in the encyclical to settle disputes among non-
dissenting schools of Catholic moral thought but only to exclude certain revisionist approaches.  The 
pope states clearly in the encyclical that he “does not intend to impose upon the faithful any 
particular theological system, still less a philosophical one”.77 
Not only was the encyclical Veritatis splendor not directed against, nor overtly incompatible with, 
the approach developed by Grisez, but since 1970 there has been no Magisterial censure of 
theologians or philosophers of that school either in general or in relation to craniotomy in particular.  
Indeed, in 1992 a work of Grisez which advocated this position on craniotomy was granted an 
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Imprimatur.  This imprimatur was not withdrawn in the wake of the publication of Veritatis Splendor 
nor has it been withdrawn in the subsequent twenty years.  Professor Flannery is no doubt aware of 
this volume as he is thanked in the preface for his helpful comments on various chapters.78  Similarly 
while Anderson et al raise the question as to whether Rhonheimer’s comments in relation to the 
Holy Office decrees “constitute infidelity to the magisterial teaching” 79 it is clear that Rhonheimer 
showed every willingness to submit his opinions to the Magisterium and it seems that the CDF not 
only permitted but actively encouraged Rhonheimer to publish his views.80    
The most recent Magisterial statement on abortion is also the one most immediately relevant to 
vital conflicts between mother and unborn child.  In 2009, in response to the controversy 
surrounding a particular case in Brazil, the CDF issued a clarification concerning procured abortion.  
This document recalls the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church that “Since the first 
century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured abortion. This teaching has not 
changed and remains unchangeable”.81  The document also reiterates the teaching of Pope John 
Paul II that a woman’s decision “to rid herself of the fruit of conception” is not justifiable, even for 
the sake of “certain important values such as her own health or a decent standard of living for the 
other members of the family”.82  At the same time the CDF draws attention to the teaching of Pius 
XII that procedures “which would have as an accessory consequence, in no way desired or intended, 
but inevitable, the death of the fetus” would not necessarily constitute “a direct attack on the 
innocent life”.83  
This intervention of the CDF was timely given the use of such examples by the media and even by 
some dissenting Catholics to undermine the Church’s de fide teaching on abortion.  However, it is 
important to note that neither that document nor the teachings of Pius XII or John Paul II resolve the 
key issue of dispute among contemporary non-dissenting moral theologians.  For the issue of dispute 
is precisely which interventions constitute “a direct attack on human life” and which involve the 
death of the child as something knowingly caused but “in no way desired or intended”.  
Further considerations of historical context  
It should be noted that the interventions of the Holy Office between 1884-1902 in relation to vital 
conflicts between mother and child were not characteristic of the reticence of Magisterium on this 
difficult question prior to the nineteenth century.  To understand these interventions it is necessary 
to recognise the particularity of the historical context.  They occurred within the period from Pius IX 
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refinements in respect to its application, these must be completed by the magisterium” (Grisez Living a 
Christian Life, chapter 8, footnote 85).  
81 CDF “Clarification on procured abortion” quoting John Paul II, Catechism of the Catholic Church (Citta del 
Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), n. 2271. 
82 CDF “Clarification on procured abortion” quoting Evangelium Vitae, n. 58. 
83 CDF “Clarification on procured abortion” quoting Pius XII Allocution to large families. 
to Pius XII where the Church adopted a highly critical attitude in response to “modern” 
developments occurring in a world which seemed increasingly hostile to the Church.84    
More particularly, these interventions all occur within the pontificate of Leo XIII, who encouraged a 
movement which was attempting to construct and defend a single overarching methodology for 
Catholic theology modelled on that of Thomas Aquinas.  Whereas in the first half of the nineteenth 
century there had been a plurality of approaches within Catholic theology, even within seminaries, 
the latter part of the century saw an attempt to restrict Catholic theology to a single approved 
method.  No less than the pontificates of Pius IX who preceded him, or of Pius X who succeeded him, 
the pontificate of Leo XIII showed a very high degree of caution about what could “safely be taught”.  
Declarations to this effect, while they may well have been justified in that context, need to be 
understood against this particular historical background.     
The Second Vatican Council represented a shift away from the approach taken during the period 
from Pius IX to Pius XII,85 and encouraged theologians to engage positively with the modern world 
wherever possible.  In this new context there was an explicit acknowledgement of a plurality of 
methodologies within Catholic theology.  This is evident in the quotation of Pope John Paul II that he 
“does not intend to impose upon the faithful any particular theological system, still less a 
philosophical one”.86  Such a statement is in marked contrast to the prevalent attitude at during the 
pontificate of Leo XIII, though it would have been unremarkable in the seventeenth century or 
indeed in the time of Thomas Aquinas.   
An interesting example of the shift of context is provided by the positive reference John Paul II 
makes to Rosmini in the encyclical Fides at Ratio, as a theologian who achieved a fruitful exchange 
between philosophy and the Word of God.87  This judgement is in contrast to attitude of the Holy 
Office in 1887, which condemned a number of propositions taken from the works of Rosmini. 88 
Subsequent to John Paul’s statement, the CDF produced a clarification which urged that attention be 
given “not just of the Congregation's texts, but of their context and of the situation in which they 
were promulgated, which also allows for historical development”.89  An important part of that 
context was comprised by the efforts of the Papal Magisterium in the late nineteenth century “to 
foster Thomism as a philosophical and theoretical instrument, aimed at offering a unifying synthesis 
of ecclesiastical studies”.90  A fresh judgment in the current context requires “taking into account the 
                                                          
84 It may be noticed that English and American state law and Catholic canon law all saw a shift in relation to 
abortion in the mid-nineteenth century, with the abandonment of the concept of “quickening” or delayed 
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results emerging from historiography and from the scientific and theoretical research of the last ten 
years”.91 
In the case of the interventions by the Holy office regarding vital conflicts analogous considerations 
also apply.  As with the case of Rosmini, the shift of context reflects the weight of further “scientific 
and theoretical research” among scholars faithful to the Magisterium.  In relation to abortion, the 
period following the Second Vatican Council and Humanae Vitae has witnessed an unprecedented 
challenge to the fundamental principles of moral theology.  This in turn has led to a rich discourse 
among philosophers and theologians faithful to the Magisterium seeking to address this challenge.  
Furthermore in both cases, within this new scholarly context, a new Magisterial statement in the 
form of a papal encyclical provides the touchstone for contemporary discussion.  In relation to 
Rosmini this was Fides et Ratio (1998).  In relation to abortion these are the moral encyclicals of 
Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (1993) and more especially Evangelium Vitae (1995).   
Conclusion  
The document Donum Veritatis makes clear that, where the Magisterium, even though not intending 
to act definitively, intervenes to “guard against ideas that are incompatible with these truths [of 
faith]” the response to such interventions “cannot be simply exterior or disciplinary but must be 
understood within the logic of faith and under the impulse of obedience to the faith”.92   Even on 
matter “per se not irreformable” the norm must be a willingness to submit loyally to the 
Magisterium with the religious submission of will and intellect. 
At the same time Donum Veritatis states that the Catholic theologian “cannot pursue his discipline 
well without a certain competence in history”.93  With this historical sensitivity comes an awareness 
“of the filtering which occurs with the passage of time… The theologian knows that some judgments 
of the Magisterium could be justified at the time in which they were made, because while the 
pronouncements contained true assertions and others which were not sure, both types were 
inextricably connected. Only time has permitted discernment and, after deeper study, the 
attainment of true doctrinal progress.”94   
Such a reference to doctrinal progress is also found in the Note of the CDF on the doctrinal decrees 
on the work of Rosmini.  That Note recommends “an attentive reading not just of the Congregation's 
texts, but of their context and of the situation in which they were promulgated, which also allows for 
historical development”.95  Furthermore, in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, it is made explicit that 
such development of doctrine occurs also in the realm of the morality of action.  “The Church has 
faithfully preserved what the word of God teaches, not only about truths which must be believed 
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but also about moral action, action pleasing to God (cf. 1 Th 4:1); she has achieved a doctrinal 
development analogous to that which has taken place in the realm of the truths of faith”.96 
In regard to this doctrinal development and the “filtering” of what is necessary and what is 
contingent in the area of Catholic teaching on abortion, certain principles and doctrines have gained 
weight and authority since 1884.  In particular, the Magisterium has reiterated the principle that 
direct and deliberate killing of an unborn child by abortion is never morally permissible, even for the 
sake of saving the life of the child’s mother.  It is this principle, made explicit in the decree 1889 that 
informs the particular judgements on different procedures in the decrees of 1884, 1889, 1895, 1898, 
and 1902.  This key principle has been reiterated in subsequent teaching documents, culminating in 
the encyclical Evangelium Vitae. 
On the other hand, in relation to the particular judgements of the Holy Office in the late nineteenth 
century, these express a heightened degree of caution that was characteristic of the period.  Grisez 
and Rhonheimer have also argued, with some justification, that the dominant moral theology of that 
time was far from clear about the relation between directness, intention, and physical immediacy.  
Within this context theologians did not succeed in making a convincing case that would exonerate 
craniotomy from the claim that it involved direct killing.  The Holy Office having declared that 
craniotomy could not safely be taught, suspicion was then extended to arguments in favour of 
acceleratio partus, of caesarean section prior to viability and of the removal of the ectopic embryo.  
In may be noted that, such was its reluctance to identify as morally safe any procedure that involved 
or led to the death of the unborn child, every one of the dubia from 1884 to 1902 involving such 
cases was answered in the negative (the exceptions were only where the child had a chance of 
survival).  Indeed, it is argued here, that a prima facie reading of these decrees would also rule out 
salpingectomy and other procedures that enjoyed widespread support among Catholic moral 
theologians even in the 1930s.  The theological context created by the Second Vatican Council and 
by a subsequent fifty years of scholarly research on fundamental moral concepts requires that these 
earlier statements be re-evaluated. 
With due respect to Professor Flannery, careful analysis does not therefore show that it is “very 
apparent… that the type of analysis that Rhonheimer [and Lysaught]97 and Grisez adopt is… 
incompatible with Church teaching”.98  A reading of the decisions of the Holy Office from 1884 to 
1902 in their historical context and in the light of subsequent theological development and current 
Magisterial teaching shows the great difficulty of applying them directly to the contemporary 
debate.   
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It is not the aim of this article to defend the moral permissibility of craniotomy, or indeed of any 
other particular interventions which aim to save a mother’s life but which involve or lead to the 
death of her unborn child (acceleratio partus, salpingectomy, salpingostomy, the use of 
methotrexate etc.).  Its aim is rather to emphasise the importance of attention to historical context 
when interpreting the former statements of the Magisterium in this area.  The methodologies and 
the particular conclusions of Grisez and of Rhomheimer may yet be shown to be deficient through 
theological discussion or in a subsequent intervention of the Magisterium, but at present neither of 
these approaches can be excluded on the basis of overt incompatibility with former or current 
Magisterial teaching.  If these views are to be challenged, this must be on the basis of appeal to 
philosophical or theological argument, not by direct appeal to authority.  In particular, appeal to 
former decisions of the Holy Office, and of statements of Pius XI and Pius XII, is not sufficient to 
exclude such approaches.  
 
 
